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SAY IT LOUD: INDIRECT SPEECH AND RACIAL EQUALITY IN
THE INTERROGATION ROOM
C.Antoinette Clarke*
I. INTRODUCTION

To put it in the simplest of terms, the criminal justice system treats ethnic
and cultural minorities differently than it does whites. This disparate
treatment is reflected in the end product of the system, that is, the fact that
African Americans are vastly over-represented in prisons and jails relative to
their numbers in the general population.' It extends as far back as the first
level of the criminal justice process, the point at which police decide who they
will investigate, approach, stop, frisk, and ultimately arrest
Black and
Hispanic males are more likely to be stopped by police than any other
population group.' But perhaps the most pernicious area in which this
dissimilar treatment is abundantly evident is in the constitutional protection
(or lack thereof) afforded minority suspects.
Constitutional rights can be diminished or endangered in many ways.
The most obvious, of course, is a frontal assault in which opponents argue that
the right itself does not exist. A right could be attacked less directly as wellfrom the "flanks" as it were-by adversaries attempting to narrow the scope
of the right. However, a much more subtle tactic exists by which opponents
of the constitutional right seek to weaken it from the "inside," that is, from the
position of the rights-holder's attempts to invoke the right.
* Assistant Professor, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law. I would like
to thank Dean Rodney Smith for his boundless support and encouragement. I would also like
to thank Trey Kitchens and Quest Research for his invaluable assistance.
1. See MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, YOUNG BLACK MEN AND THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A GROWING NATIONAL PROBLEM 3 (1990) (one in four young
African-American men are under custodial supervision of some kind; the comparable figure for
whites is one in 25).
2. See generally Robert H. Whor, "Coercive Ambiguity" in the Routine Traffic Stop

Turned Consent Search, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 379 (1997); David A. Harris, Factorsfor a
Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659
(1994); Jennifer A. Larrabee, Note, "DWB (DrivingWhile Black)" andEqual Protection: The
Realities of an UnconstitutionalPolice Practice,6 J.L. & POL'Y 291 (1997).
3. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 2, at 681 (arguing that the aggressive use of Terry stops
in high crime neighborhoods results in a higher number of stops for African Americans and

Hispanic Americans, the people most likely to live in such neighborhoods); Tracey Maclin,
"Black and Blue Encounters" - Some Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth Amendment
Seizures: ShouldRace Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REv. 243, 251-53 (1991) (describing numerous
instances of less than legal street encounters between police and black males, concluding that
"[b]lack men know they are liable to be stopped at any time, and that when they question the

authority of the police, the response from the cops is often swift and violent. This applies to
black men of all economic strata, regardless of their level of education, and whatever their job

status or place in the community.").
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The invocation of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel established
under Mirandav. Arizona4 is one such right. Miranda has been overruled by
Congressional fiat,' decimated by judicially crafted qualifications6 and the
public safety exception,7 and no longer operates as the restraint to overzealous
law enforcement that its progenitors intended.' Mirandahas been rendered
an abject failure, even when viewed from the limited perspective of providing
a "bright-line" rule for police interrogation practices.9 To a large extent,
Miranda has produced paradoxes that the Warren Court would never have
imagined---circumstances in which Miranda has been stripped of its
Constitutional status," and the safeguards outlined in the decision have served
to protect only the strong and the savvy. "
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULES OF INVOCATION
The privilege against self-incrimination is firmly ingrained in American
popular culture as well as its jurisprudence." Indeed, twenty-five years ago,
Chief Justice Rehnquist remarked that "at this point in our history virtually
every schoolboy is familiar with the concept, if not the language, of the
provision that reads: 'No person ...shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself .... ""' The irony in Miranda lies in the
Court's recognition that a suspect who does not ask for counsel is the person
most in need of a lawyer's assistance. 4

4. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994).
6. See Charles F. Baird, The Habeas CorpusRevolution: A New Role for State Courts?,
27 ST. MARY'S L.J. 197,209 (1996).
7. See Stephen F. Goodman, CriminalLaw-FifthAmendment Miranda Warnings-An
Exception to Administering Miranda WarningsExists Where Police QuestioningIs Prompted
by Concernfor Public Safety, New York v. Quarles, 16 ST. MARY's L.J. 489, 501 (1985).
8. See Nancy M. Kennelly, Note, Davis v. United States: The Supreme CourtRejects a
Third Layer of Prophylaxis,26 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 589, 595 (1995).
9. See The Supreme Court, 1984 Term -Leading Cases,99 HARV. L. REV. 120, 141,146
(1985).
10. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974) (recognizing that Miranda
warnings are merely procedural safeguards against self-incrimination, and therefore not
protected by the Constitution, the Court- stated: "We cannot say that the Constitution
necessarily requires adherence to any particular solution for the inherent compulsions of the
interrogation process as it is currently conducted." (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
467 (1966))).
11. See infra notes 66 through 104 and accompanying text.
12. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 439 (1974).
13. Id.
14. See Miranda,384 U.S. at 470-71.
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The tension between adhering to the rule of law and enforcing order is
the fundamental dichotomy confronting police officers. 5 Socio-political
factors, in turn, affect police reactions to this tension. 6 As Jerome Skolnick
aptly observed, "when prominent members of the community become far more
aroused over an apparent rise in criminality than over the fact that AfricanAmericans are frequently subjected to unwarranted police interrogation,
detention, and invasions of privacy, the police will continue to engage in such
practices." 7 And so they have. 8 Equally apt is the observation that if rights
are respected only if asserted in the majority manner, only the majority's
rights are protected. And so they are.
A brief view ofthe social and political backdrop of Mirandais warranted
here. It is impossible to analyze Miranda without the benefit of some of the
practical realities that underscore the decision. The majority of Justices who
crafted Mirandahad several alternatives to consider in deciding the scope of
the right against self-incrimination. 9 Thus, Mirandarepresents a compromise
struck by the majority that reflected the social and political conditions that
must have either subtly or consciously affected the majority's reasoning. 0
The socio-political climate during which Miranda was decided was
strikingly similar to today's socio-political climate: rising crime rates and
increased racial tension. Social conditions in the 1960's were a motivating
factor for change. Race riots played a prominent role, fueled in large part by
the friction between the police and the black communities in northern
ghettos.2' The civil rights movement had revealed the abuse of power by
15. See SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: AHISTORYOFAMERICANCRIMINALJUSTICE

222, 226 (1980).
16.

See JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRiAL:

LAW ENFORCEMENT IN

DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 239-40 (3d ed. 1994).
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Paul W. Valentine, MarylandSettles Lawsuit Over RacialProfiles; Police
Allegedly Targeted Minorities for Searches, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 1995, at B 1; Michael
Schneider, State Police 1-95 Drug Unit Found to Search Black Motorists Four Times More
Often Than White: Analysis Raises QuestionsAbout Trooper Procedures,BALTIMORE SUN,
May 23, 1996, at 2B; Hart Seely, Black Males Say It's Normalfor Police to Findan Excuse to
Stop Their Cars and HuntforDrugs, SYRACUSE HERALD A.M., Oct. 22,. 1995, at Al 2; Linn
Washington, Jr., Racism is Drivingthe War on Drugs in New Jersey, STAR-LEDGER (Newark,
NJ), June 19, 1996, at 99; Patrick O'Driscoll, DrugProfile Lawsuit Settled; Minority Motorists
Stopped, DENVER POST, Nov. 10, 1995, at Al.
19. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S, 436, 483-90 (1966). Arguably, a more radical
approach than that crafted by the majority could have meant the end for confessions as a vital
tool of law enforcement. See YALE KAMIsAR, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (8th ed. 1994).
A weaker alternative to Mirandacould have run against the countervailing current of protection
for the poor, the underprivileged, and the disempowered, against the overwhelming power of
the government. See Miranda,384 U.S. at 457, 472-473.
20. See Miranda,384 U.S. at 479-81.
21. See SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: AHISTORYOFAMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
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police as a means of squelching the demand for equal rights.22 As one
prominent historian put it, "the criminal-justice crisis of the 1960's focused
on the cops in the ghetto."23
Between 1964 and 1968, rioting spread throughout forty-three American
cities after a white police officer shot and killed a black teenager.24 Ultimately, the Kerner Commission, appointed by President Lyndon B. Johnson
to investigate these civil disorders, concluded that the root cause of the
problem was racism.25 Significantly, as reflected by the first riot in New
York, the police were the primary instigators of the riots.26 Blacks in northern
ghettos, in turn, viewed the then all-white police as a virtual "army of
occupation" in their communities. 7 To counterbalance this trend, the
Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice Earl Warren, stressed the need to temper
police zeal and afford some measure of justice and equality to the disempowered.2 S
Mirandaarguably represents the high-water mark of the Warren Court's
activism. The decision is the foundation of the evolving case law concerning
the Fifth Amendment right to counsel. In Miranda, the Supreme Court
recognized the need to establish a protective rule in order to safeguard the
suspect's Fifth Amendment right to be free from compulsory self-incrimination." The rule has two interrelated objectives: it protects the suspect's
constitutional rights and ensures that the confession will not be rendered

inadmissible.30 To this end, the familiar warnings3 were crafted in the belief
that they would be sufficient to overcome the "inherent coerciveness" of the
222(1980).
22. See id.

23. Id.
24. See id. at 223.
25. See id. at 224.
26. See id.
27. See WALKER, supra note 21, at 222.

28. See WALKER, supranote 21, at 229-30; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,439(1966).
29. See generally Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436 (noting that widespread abuses by police

officers, such as beatings, hangings, and whippings were being used to elicit confessions).
30. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1985) ("Miranda attempted to reconcile
[competing] concerns by giving the defendant the power to exert some control over the course
of the interrogation.").
31. The Miranda court held that a suspect must be clearly advised on his right to remain
silent, and that anything he says can be used against him in a court proceeding. The suspect
must also be informed of his right to counsel, and must be advised that if he is unable to afford
counsel, one must be provided for him at the state's expense. The court went on to hold that
after being advised of these rights, the suspect can choose to waive the rights and answer
questions. Nevertheless, if during the questioning, the suspect indicates "in any manner," that
he has decided to reinvoke the right to counsel or silence, the officers must immediately end the
interrogation. See Miranda,384 U.S. at 444-45 (emphasis added).
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custodial interrogation.32 The guiding principle behind the decision was to
level the playing field with regard to police-controlled investigations.
Some critics argued that the decision was antithetical to law
enforcement," while others have asserted that "far from handcuffing the
police, the warnings work to liberate the police. Miranda'smuch maligned
rules permit the officer to continue questioning the isolated suspect, the very
process the Court found to be in violation of the Fifth Amendment."34 Still
others have offered proposals to "Mirandize" Miranda,that is, to demand that
all suspects in custody have a "nonwaivable" right to "consult" with an
attorney before any police interrogation.35
Within one week of issuing Miranda, the Court let it be known that,
much like politicians and the American public, it was acutely conscious of the
insidious effect of crime on the social fabric.36 Congress was likewise
motivated by the "tough on crime" clarion call, and responded by enacting the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Section 3501 of the
Act overruled Miranda.37
Although the proyision overruled Miranda,Section 3501 did not reject
Miranda outright. It did, after all, recognize that the warnings played an
important role in determining the voluntariness of a confession. 3' The statute
merely refused to accord the warnings the talismanic status conferred by
39 The relevant provision states that in any federal jurisdiction or in
Miranda.
the District of Columbia, a confession "shall be admissible in evidence if it is
voluntarily given."4' It also sets forth a list of factors to be taken into account
in assessing the voluntariness of the confession,4 including whether the
defendant knew about the right to remain silent and that anything he said
could be used against him;42 whether he was advised of the right to counsel

32. See id.
33. See DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILiNG STREETS 211 (1991).
34. Steven J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435,454 (1987).
35. See Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Goodfor the Soul? A Proposal to
Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1826, 1842 (1987).
36. Johnson v. New Jersey,the case in which the Court held that Mirandawould not apply
retroactively, was decided one week after Miranda. See Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719
(1966). Reluctant to release numerous prisoners by applying Miranda retroactively, the
majority noted that such a ruling "would require the retrial or release of numerous prisoners
found guilty by trustworthy evidence in conformity with previously announced constitutional
standards." See id. at 73 1.
37. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994).
38. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (1994).
39. See id.
40. Id.
41. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b) (1998).
42. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b)(3) (1994).
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before being interrogated;43 and whether the confession was given in the
absence of counsel." The presence or absence of any of these factorsincluding the Miranda warnings-is not dispositive on the issue of the
voluntariness of the confession. 5
The enactment itself amply illustrates the legislative response to the
Court's activism. The public clamor for "tough on crime" legislation was
overwhelming.' The Bill was not only popular with Congress, it also echoed
public sentiment."7 However, "it sat there unused by prosecutors for 30
years." ' In early February, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals revived the
constitutional status of Section 3501 when a three-judge panel declared that
in federal cases, investigators and officers need not advise suspects of their
right to remain silent and consult a lawyer in order for a confession to be
admissible. 9 Commentators and legal scholars believe that the decision "sets
the stage for a significant Supreme Court decision revisiting the status of
Miranda."50

Within three years of the enactment of Section 3501, the Supreme Court
launched its own Mirandacounterrevolution. The changing composition of
the Supreme Court altered Miranda'slatitude, resulting in a retrenchment that
restricted the opinion's reach5' and ultimately divested it of its constitutional
status. 2 Despite the erosion of the opinion's effect, however, one facet of
Miranda withstood dilution for many years-the seemingly absolute
prohibition of interrogation when a suspect invokes her right not to be
questioned without an attorney. In Edwards v. Arizona,53 the Court held that
once the accused expresses the desire not to be questioned without an attorney
43. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b)(4) (1998).
44. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b)(5) (1998).
45. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b) (1998).
46. See JAMEs T. PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITES STATES, 1945-1974,

651 (1996).
47. See id. at 650-51.
48. William Glaberson, After 33 Years of Controversy, Miranda Ruling Faces Its Most
Serious Challenge, THE N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1999, at A24.
49. See Brooke A. Masters, Ruling on "Miranda"Appears Headedfor High Court,THE
WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 1999, at B09.
50. Glaberson, supra note 48, at A24 (quoting A.E. Dick Howard, Professor of
Constitutional Law, University of Virginia Law School).
51. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (holding that statements taken in
violation of Miranda could be used to impeach the defendant's testimony at trial, despite
Miranda'sdicta to the contrary); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975) (same).
52. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (declaring that the "procedural
safeguards" erected by Miranda were not constitutional mandates, but rather prophylactic
measures adopted to insure that the Fifth Amendment right against compulsory selfincrimination was protected.).
53. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
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present, he "is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until
counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates
further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police."'
Extending Edwards to its logical limit, the majority in Minnick v.
Mississippi" seemed satisfied with the apparent clarity and certainty of the
Edwardsrule." Mere consultation with an attorney is not sufficient to protect
the suspect once she has invoked her right to counsel under Edwards."
Rather, when the suspect asks for an attorney, "interrogation must cease, and
officials may not reinitiate interrogation without counsel present, whether or
' It is evident, therefore, that
not the accused has consulted with his attorney."58
a suspect who unequivocally demands an attorney before being questioned
receives the full panoply of Miranda's"prophylactic" safeguards.
It is the equivocal request for counsel that has provided the final deathblow for Miranda. Despite the language in Mirandathat seems to hold that
interrogators must recognize a request for an attorney if made "in any
manner," 59 state and lower federal courts faced with equivocal requests for
counsel have adopted one of three different approaches. Some jurisdictions
require that the invocation of the right to counsel be direct and unambiguous
before it is given any legal effect.6° Other jurisdictions allow police to
continue questioning a suspect whose invocation is ambiguous or equivocal,
but only to determine if the suspect in fact desires an attorney.6 Still others
treat any recognizable invocation as legally sufficient to bar further interrogation.62
For years, the Supreme Court was able to sidestep the issue.63 However,
in Davis v. United States," the Court was finally forced to take a stand on
54. See id at 484-85.

55. 498 U.S. 146 (1990).
56. See id
dat l51.
57. See id. at 153.
58. Id.

59. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
60. See id.

61. See United States v. Cherry, 733 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1056 (1987).
62. See Howard v. Pung, 862 F.2d 1348 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 920 (1989)
(adopting cessation upon reference approach); People v. Kreuger, 412 N.E.2d 537 (Ill.
1980)

(same).

63. For example, in Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91 (1984), the Supreme Court recognized
that lower courts had "conflicting standards for determining the consequences of such

ambiguities," but that the Court did not have to confront the issue of ambiguous requests for
counsel because the judgment of that case had to "be reversed, irrespective of which standard
is applied." Id.at 95-96, 96 n.3. The issue arose again in Connecticut v. Barrett,and was
disposed of similarly. See Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523 (1987).
64. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
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which of the approaches was correct and came up with an answer that no one
could have foreseen: none of these doctrinal approaches was correct.
According to the court in Davis, police have no duty to clarify an ambiguous
request for counsel. The burden is therefore placed on the suspect to ensure
that her rights are protected. This decision dictates that the police need only
offer a suspect access to his Mirandarights-the suspect must use the correct
words and degree of clarity in order to actually invoke these rights. If a
suspect thinks he is invoking his right to an attorney, but the police interrogators do not, then the failure to respect that right is the fault of the suspect.
According to the Court, "[t]he right to counsel established in Mirandawas one
of a 'series of recommended "procedural safeguards" ... [that] were not
themselves rights protected by the Constitution but were instead measures to
insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination was protected." 65
But the objective of promoting effective law enforcement is never served
by valuing the form of invocation over the substance of the right itself. The
invocation standard adopted by the Supreme Court, although intended to
protect the individual from the abuse of power by police, in practice provides
significantly inferior protection to the least powerful in society. The rules
protect the shrewd criminal, not the powerless suspect.66
In. THE DISCRIMINATORY IMPACT OF THEDA VIS REQUIREMENTS

The current law concerning the invocation of Fifth Amendment rights
provides enhanced constitutional protection from police interrogation for
those who use direct and assertive modes of expression, but penalizes those
who adopt indirect or qualified ways of speaking. 67 The degree of protection
65. Id. at 457 (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,444 (1974)).
66. David Simon describes the tale of two professional hit men who "matched" each other
corpse for corpse, as Baltimore's "premier contact killers." See SIMON, supra note 33, at 210.
Every instance in which they were brought into police headquarters for questioning yielded the
same result. See SIMON, supranote 33, at 210. These consummate criminals knew exactly what
to do during a custodial interrogation. They would be read Miranda,they would immediately
invoke the right to an attorney, and the process would unceremoniously end. See SIMON, supra
note 33, at 210. Mirandawas their staunchest ally. The close quarters and police-dominated
ambiance failed to threaten these men into submission. See SIMoN, supra note 33, at 210. What
is ironic about all of this is that Miranda wound up protecting not the poor, indigent,
intimidated suspect that the Warren Court sought so fervently to shield from police domination.
See SIMON, supra note 33, at 211. Rather, it became the sword of the tough, hardened criminal
who has the requisite emotional make-up to resist the "inherent" pressures of custodial
interrogation. See SIMON, supra note 33, at 210.
67. Janet Ainsworth has identified several linguistic behaviors that are characteristic of an
indirect or deferential manner of speaking, including: (1) use of hedges (expressions that make
a statement less precise or emphatic, such as "kind of," or "perhaps", (2) use of tag questions
(used when the speaker is seeking to solicit agreement, corroboration, or acquiescence, or when
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afforded the varying groups clearly rests on the assumption that people
naturally do and should use direct and unqualified ways of speaking.
However, this linguistic behavior is most typical of white American males."
Females, ethnic, and cultural minorities more often adopt indirect and
deferential speech patterns. Because the legal doctrine governing a person's
rights during police interrogation treats prototypically male behavior and
experience (confident, assertive, powerful) as synonymous with human
behavior and experience, this ostensibly gender- and race-neutral doctrine
contains a hidden bias. The real world repercussions of such a bias are by no
means inconsequential. If minorities are indeed disadvantaged by this
doctrine, then the law has compromised the ability of millions of arrestees to
exercise their constitutional rights.
By stressing the need for an "unequivocal" assertion of the need for an
attorney as a prerequisite for a suspect to terminate custodial interrogation, the
court in Davis practically insured that these groups would be unduly
disadvantaged. 69 By rewarding the "direct and assertive" speech patterns of
the powerful,"0 the Court discriminates against the indirect speech patterns
characteristic of the powerless, 7 1 the very persons these prophylactic rules
were intended to protect.
Davis' command is stringent: absent an unequivocal request for counsel,
Miranda'ssafeguards are illusory.72 Expressions such as: "Maybe I should
talk to a lawyer" simply won't suffice.' In fact, such a statement will not
even require the interrogators to stop questioning the suspect in order to
clarify what she meant or desired.74 The standard as set forth in Davis instead
puts the burden on the suspect to "articulate his desire to have counsel present
sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would
understand the statement to be a request for an attorney."" The arbiter of
the speaker wishes to avoid confronting the listener with an unqualified assertion, for example,
"I should see a lawyer, shouldn't I?;") (3) use of modal verbs (such as "may," "might," "could,"
or "ought," again used to soften emphasis); and (4) avoidance of imperatives and the use of
indirect interrogatives as a substitute for the imperative (for example "Would you call my
lawyer?" instead of "Call my lawyer."). The interrogatives are less presumptive and more
tactfully deferential than baldly stated imperatives.). Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different
Register: The Pragmaticsof Powerlessnessin PoliceInterrogation,103 YALE L. J.259, 27582 (1993).
68. See id. at 315-16.
69. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 459-60.
70. See Ainsworth, supra note 67, at 315.
71. See Ainsworth, supra note 67, at 316-19.
72. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 462.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 459.

UALR LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2 1

whether the suspect made an unequivocal request is the officer at the station,76
that is, the person in control of the inherently compulsive interrogation
process."
Clearly, what constitutes a request according to one person may not be
considered such by another. The Supreme Court itself recognized this danger
when it stated:
We recognize that requiring a clear assertion of the right to counsel might
disadvantage some suspects who-because of fear, intimidation, lack of
linguistic skills, or a variety of other reasons-will not clearly articulate
their right to counsel although they actually want to have a lawyer
present.8
According to Justice Souter, many suspects "lack anything like a confident
command of the English language," and many people "will be sufficiently
intimidated by the interrogation process or overwhelmed by the uncertainty
of their predicament that the ability to speak assertively will abandon them."79'
But isn't it the powerless-those subject to fear, intimidation, poor language
skills-who are most in need of the protections of the Fifth Amendment?
Recognizing the problem without remedying it sends a clear message to the
affected class. At best, it represents indifference to our cultural differences;
at worst, antipathy: "We will accord you the protection of our laws, so long
as you think and act as we do."
Legal scholars have examined the role of gender, race, and cultural
background in language and mode of expression, and have found that all three
factors can have a profound effect upon the invocation of the right to
counsel.8 " And lest we fall into the trap of believing that this problem is
simply bi-chromatic-and therefore easier to ignore-of the many societies
that differ from the Anglo-European structure, Asian societies display the
greatest conflict with the Supreme Court's assumptions regarding the assertion
of individual rights.8" While the assertion of individuality is endorsed and
76. See id. at 461.
77. See id. at 460.

78. Davis, 512 U.S. at 460. Despite recognizing these concerns, Justice O'Connor
nevertheless found that a recitation of the Miranda warnings is the only constitutional
responsibility police officers have prior to and during interrogation. See id.
79. See id. at 469-70 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
80. See generally Ainsworth, supra note 67; Thurman Garner, Cooperative
Communication Strategies: Observations in a Black Community, 14 J.BLACK STUD. 233

(1983). For a complete discussion of speech communication and the differences between the
sexes in the workplace, see DEBORAH TANNEN, TALKING FROM 9 TO 5: How WOMEN'S AND
MEN'S CONVERSATIONAL STYLES AFFECT WHO GETS HEARD, WHO GETS CREDIT, AND WHAT

GETS DONE AT WORK (1994).
81. See HARUYAMADA, AMERICAN AND JAPANESE BUSINESS DISCOURSE: A COMPARISON
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encouraged in American society, Asian societies operate to the contrary.
Members of an Asian community, regardless of whether they are in the
country of origin of their culture or in American society, are taught to respect
and support the good of the group over the good of the individual. 2 This
outlook translates into a greater deference to authority and a predisposition to
maintain silence when faced with a problem. 3 As one commentator observed:
Each American individual has rights, expresses these rights, and expects
others to listen to such requests. When a right is abused, it is equally as
important for the abused to "stand up for his or her rights," as it is for
others to try to correct the unjustified situation. Thus rights are a critical
criteria for individuality .... For Japanese, the proverb "The nail that
sticks out gets hammered back in" reflects how [a person] should not stand
out.Y
Consequently, a member of an Asian society would be much less likely to
assert his individual rights. To do so would be to disregard a societal
paradigm that is firmly entrenched within the Asian culture.
Another aspect of the cultural differences that affect an Asian American's invocation of the right to counsel is the mode of speech used. While
Americans are noted for their direct manner of speech, equating directness
with power and intelligence, many other cultures utilize varieties of indirectness as the norm in communication.85 The use of an indirect method of speech
is preferred in Asian society and is considered sophisticated."" Furthermore,
a greater value is placed on silence than speech in Asian societies, and ideas
are believed best communicated without being explicitly stated. 7 Transferring this idea into the Fifth Amendment context, it is easy to see how this
cultural pressure and indirect method of speech would inhibit a direct and
unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel.
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82. See id. at 29-33.
83. See id.
84. Adam Geoffrey Finger, Comment, How Do You Get a Lawyer Around Here? The
AmbiguousInvocation ofa Defendant'sRight to Counsel UnderMiranda v. Arizona, 79 MARQ.

L. REV. 1041, 1061 (1996).
85. See TANNEN, supra note 80, at 85. See also Ainsworth, supra note 67, at 261 ("An
indirect mode of expression is characteristic of the language used by powerless persons, both
those who are members of certain groups that have historically been powerless within society,
as well as those who are powerless because of the particular situation in which they find
themselves.").
86. See TANNEN, supra note 80, at 96.
87. See TANNEN, supra note 80, at 96.
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Another consideration that must be taken into account in this context is
the importance of authority in the Asian culture."' Nowhere else in the world
is authority, whether familial or societal, more respected and promoted than
in Asian cultures.89 One sociologist stated, "[A]lthough Asians have
traditionally tended to crave stronger authority.., the West has... an
enthusiasm for checking authority." As a result, respect for authority is
likely to compel an Asian-American suspect to answer questions posed by the
police to a greater degree than a non-Asian-American suspect. Although an
Asian-American may not directly assert his Fifth Amendment right to counsel
because of societal influences, he will nevertheless answer questions from an
authoritative figure because of those same influences. Further, Asian norms
of behavior may require initially refusing an offer, with the expectation that
the offeror should and will make the offer again.91 To accept an offer the first
time it is offered is considered impolite and impertinent.92 Obviously,
someone whose cultural conventions include this rule of first refusal would
be unlikely to invoke the right to counsel directly and unambiguously upon
being read Miranda rights, despite the desire for the assistance of counsel.
Thus, current legal doctrine does not serve the interests of those communities
whose speech and behavior patterns deviate from implicitly white male
normative speech and behavior patterns.
Even in cultures whose speech is not characterized by indirect modes of
expression, individual speakers who are socially or situationally powerless
frequently adopt indirect speech patterns.93 Feelings of powerlessness may
motivate a criminal suspect to use indirect rather than direct or assertive
speech when attempting to invoke their rights, speech patterns that the law
currently refuses to recognize. The dynamics of the police interrogation
setting inherently involve a disparity of power between the suspect, who is
situationally powerless, and the interrogator, whose role demands the exercise
of power. An imbalance of power in the interrogation session increases the
likelihood that a particular suspect will adopt an indirect, and thus seemingly
equivocal, mode of expression. If suspects are unsure of themselves or their
rights, they may not want to do or say anything that will exacerbate their
problems. In such situations, the suspect might revert to a form of speech
pattern called "hedging," in which.the suspect tries to make his desires clear,
88. See LUCIEN W. PYE, AsIAN POwER AND PoLrIcs: THE CULTuRAL DIMENSIONS OF
AuTHORrrY 31-54 (1985).
89. See id. at 38.
90. Id
91. See MURiEL SAvILLE-TROiKE, THEETHNOGRAPHY OF COMMUNiCATION 33-34 (2d ed.
1989).
92. See id.
93. See Ainsworth, supra note 67, at 263.
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might say
but is afraid of making any bold demands. For example, a suspect
' 94
lawyer.
a
want
"I
than
rather
lawyer,"
a
get
should
"I suppose I
Historically disempowered communities manifest similar linguistic
characteristics. In his analysis of Black English, Thurmon Garner describes
what he termed a "strategy of indirection" by speakers as a linguistic
mechanism to avoid conflict. 95 The speaker's "message is delivered as
suggestions, innuendos, implications, insinuations, or inferences." ' This use
of indirect speech patterns typifies the rhetoric of persons without power;
these patterns can easily be found in the adaptive speech patterns of African
Americans forced to deal with white authority figures. Feelings of powerlessness in the African-American community are not only situational, but are
False accusations,9 7 behavioral stereotypes," pretextual
social as well.
99
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imbalance of power between African American citizens and law enforcement.
According to one commentator:
[W]ith reason, African Americans tend to grow up believing that the law
is the enemy, because those who are sworn to uphold the law so often
enforce it in a biased way." Black males learn at an early age that
confrontations with the police should be avoided; black teenagers are
advised never to challenge a police officer, even when the officer is
wrong.'12

Under the current standards requiring a clear and unambiguous
invocation of the right to counsel, a speaker from a group that uses more
indirect speech conventions is likely to be misunderstood as having declined
to invoke that right. Such cross-cultural misunderstandings are perhaps
inevitable, but the consequences flowing from them can be minimized. The
law simply needs to take into account differing speech patterns and recognize
a variety of forms of invocation.
The Supreme Court's failure to provide equivalent protection to both
assertive and deferential speakers creates yet another problem: it has
engendered contempt for the law and has furthered the perception that
separate standards exist for majority and minority suspects. When a suspect
is told that he has a right to an attorney before or during questioning, he is led
to believe that he has a substantive right to an attorney. A suspect does not
care whether this is a "prophylactic" right or a "constitutional" right; his main
concern is if he asks for an attorney, one will be provided for him. Further,
when a suspect makes a request for an attorney, he expects questioning to
stop. If questioning does not stop because the police officer believes the
request for counsel was equivocal-leaving police free to continue
questioning-the suspect will believe that police interrogators are not
prepared to recognize his privilege against self-incrimination. The Miranda
Court explained that the primary way in which the required warnings act to
dispel the inherent coercion of the custodial setting is by "showing the
individual that his interrogators are prepared to recognize his privilege should
03
he choose to exercise it. '""
However, when a suspect has said something that
an objective listener could reasonably, although not necessarily, take to be a
request for counsel, and yet his wishes have been ignored, "he may well see
further objection as futile and confession (true or not) as the only way to end

based on presence in a high crime area and evasive behavior).
102. Maclin, supranote 3, at 255 (quoting Brent Staples, Growing Up To Fearthe Law,
N.Y. TIMES, March 28, 1991, at A25).
103. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 (1966).
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the interrogation."'0l° But he certainly will not feel as though he has been
given the protection of the rights he was just told he had.
IV. CONCLUSION

Rigid adherence to a formal mode of invocation of rights disadvantages
a significant portion of our society. The Supreme Court recognizes the
problem, but the rule remains. In the name of equal justice and color
blindness, minorities are required to set aside their own cultural norms and
historical lessons in order to invoke their constitutional rights. They must
learn to behave as the majority does. When persons of color experience
injustices that are tolerated and even sanctioned by courts and other criminal
justice officials, they develop distrust and disrespect for the justice system.
That lack of faith translates into hopelessness, frustration, and even violence.
The 1992 Los Angeles riots following the acquittal of the police officers
charged with the beating of Rodney King 5 offer an example of what may
happen when that frustration is ignored. Nondiscriminatory law enforcement
policies and effective legal remedies accessible to all aggrieved citizens must
be developed to restore the integrity of the legal process and the trust of all
citizens.
Unless and until the Supreme Court fashions a rule that will protect the
rights of those who frame their Fifth Amendment invocation in a softer and
less emphatic way than male normative speech patterns, the Court is not color
blind. It is blind to all colors but one.

104. Davis, 512 U.S. at 472-73 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
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